that Nichiren revival is behind another wave of Buddhist revival in modern times. The Nichiren wing still dominates the New Religions of Japan.
Therein as historians of religions we come back to the central question again: Why is such historic significance, such history-making potential, due the Tendai school? And here both fact and piety would have us turn to the Lotus Sutra, the Scripture of the Saddharma (True Law) of the Pundarika (Lotus, symbol of the Buddha) that is the heart and soul of this school. For indeed the glory of the Tendai school is only the derivative glory of the Lotus Sutra. But pious homage before the Saddharma is not always easy for the fac tual historian to take. A t first glance, it is not easy to see how the highly scholastic T endai philosophy, most of which is said to be based on the Madhyamika (Middle Path) system, a sastra tradition, can be so derived from this Saddharma, a sutra tradition, especially since as a sutra, the Lotus really has little to say about that emptiness philosophy and does not indulge in the kind of arabesque of triple truths with which Chih-i so excelled. But accepting the wisdom of tradition, namely that the glory of Tenaai is the glory of the Lotus SUtra, then the question now becomes: Why the Lotus Sutra?
W hat is in this sutra that makes it the crown of Mahayana sutras, the one copied more often by medieval scribes than any other and the most ancient text (fragment) to survive? A logical question to us, it is a misplaced one to the faithful. Like the Bible to the Christians, the truth of the Lotus is selfevident. This is the Word of the Buddha {buddhavacana) that declares itself as the Eternal Logos and Saddharma. This is the good news, the preacnmg of which, like in Pauline evangelical theology, resuscitates, re-actualizes, and makes present anew every time the W ord of the Buddha and the LogosDharma that is the Buddha himself. O n that final mystery, more later. Mean while remaining an outsider, a novice needs to be initiated into its mystique w ith greater objectivity than the homilies of old. Japan still has a living T endai scholastic tradition. B ut there is a need to make sense of that medieval vision for moderns, and it is hoped that through that outsider's empathy and oDjectivity， perhaps we may acquire an understanding of its profundity， especially the issue of its historic significance the pious exegetics overlook, take for granted, or fail to assess.
The Lotus Sutra as the Expression o f Popular Faith
One of the charms of the Lotus Sutra is that it satisfies both the simple soul of piety as well as the profound reflections of the philosopher. We will begin with the former because it is more obvious and， I believe, more original (to the sutra). Few scholars would deny that the Lotus Sutra was rootea m the veneration of the Buddha. This is not to say that this is the final end of the sutra. As we will see later, the final end of homage is to the Dharma and not the Buddha. Originally, the Lotus (Buddha) piety grew definitely out of the cult of the relic bones, §anra^ of the World-Honored one after his untimely demise (though timely parinirvar^a and compassionate expediency in the Lotus Sutra). Originally, not finally, the Lotus piety commemorates the cult of merit-making due stupa-worshippers. It is in that sense that the Lotus S utra had a p o p u lis t base, and according to H irakaw a, a largely laydominated base.1
Later tradition remembers that when the Buddha passed away, he en trusted the D harm a to the monks but gave his ^arira (relic bones) to the laymen. I f not de jure (the original wish of the Buddha was to see his ashes scattered), then de facto (the eight princes took possession of the relics after the monks had so deliberated). In this division of labor, the monks were or had been previously instructed by the Buddha to "Follow the Dharma and not the Person" but by default, because the laymen were thought to be inca pable of following the strenuous career of the renunciate, the laymen were left with following the Person, not the Dharm a. That is to say, they were given the expediency of venerating the Buddha's person through his physical remains, the relics, with the explicit understanding which the monks tirelessly reiterated, namely that such acts of devotion would not lead to nirvana, but would nonetheless be so meritorious as to be efficacious in securing a better samsaric rebirth. This is the classic division between nibbanic wisdom and kammatic good works that Medford Spiro the anthropologist has schema tized for his analysis of Burmese Buddhism (1970) .
But classic dictums are often more ideal than real. The Buddha, being such an extraordinary figure (the foremost one deserving of veneration from those in heaven and those on earth), that homage paid him at his stupa sites (reliquaries in which the relics are enshrined) came in the end not just from the uncouth laity who knew no better but also from the monks who did. And though proverbially we associate the liberal sectarians (Nikaya Buddhists) with greater Buddha-devotion, yet as attested to by the dedications and in scriptions on site, both conservatives and liberals were among those who joined the laity in so honoring the Buddha. The Sarvastivadins of northwest India were not lax in this regard, but the liberal Mahasamgikas understand ably did give to Buddha-devotion greater prestige and status by assessment more merits due such actions than the conservatives would. Still they stopped short of making devotion the equivalent of wisdom, still regarded as the surest path to liberation. This is understandable for we should not over romanticize the Mahasamgikas. They might be for a larger (maha) com 1
Hirakawa located the basis of Mahayana in the lay stupa cults and Shizutani modified this by pointing out how monks were also involved and how Mahayana as a distinct movement was due to certain leaders known in Mahayana texts as masters of the Law (dharmabhanakas). See Hirakawa 1963，pp. 57-105 and Shizutani 1967 . Abbott 1985 contains a review of the Hirakwara/Shizutani debate on Mahayana origins. Shizutani^ more radical thesis is not available in English, but I have introduced his ideas in Lai 1981, pp. 447-69. munity {sahgha) that included within itself the laity, but their leaders were as much monks (bhiksus). This is not a lay movement.
Although trying to draw the line between lay piety and monk wisdom is risky at best, it is still safe to assume that after the Buddha passed away, there were two foci of faith: the Buddha and the Dharma. (The third jewel, the Sangha as Refuge, is definitely added on later.) According to these two foci, there evolved two different types of literature: the jatakas or birth stories of the Buddha that grew into the Avadana corpus, and the matrka or enumera tion (of teachings by numbers) that grew into the ADhidharma genre.
The former is kammatic literature used by monks (we suspect) to edify the populace. It is focused on the Buddha. The latter we can characterize as dhammic literature, reserved for the monks alone, and Dharma-centered. The original, popular base of the Lotus cultus is such that it can be seen in the predominance in the Lotus Sutra of the mythopoeic tradition, i.e. the Avadana materials. This is very unlike the Prajnaparamita (Transcendental Wisdom) Sutras dedicated to the explication of the Dharma: the Lotus Sutra is fundamentally not a philosophical treatise. The final recension knew of philosophical matters, but as a whole the sutra made scant mention of empti ness (sunyata), was rairiy indifferent to both the Hinayana abhidharmic sub tleties and the Mahayana anti-abhidharmic dialectics. It can be impatient with one as with the other. The reasons for that we will see later. The impor tant thing to note is that in no way can the Lotus Sutra be regarded as a philosophical treatise, even less a systematic one. Its most primitive stratum is acknowledged by scholars to be very ancient and in the form of gathas, poetic verses mostly dedicated to singing the praise of the Buddha. Its strongest didache comes not in some refined doctrines but rather in the form of a series of famous parables. Even the doctrine of upaya and ekayana was formulated in terms of the parable of the burning house. In other words, Mythos and not Logos is its forte. And among the core mythic lore, the Lotus Sutra shines in a series of vyakaranas, prophecies or assurances given by the Buddha to his followers concerning their future destinies. The philosophical implication might indeed be "universal Buddhahood， ， ' for even Devadatta is redeemed as a future Buddha, but it is characteristic of the Lotus Sutra not to put that forward in a line like the Nirvana Sutra's "A ll sentient beings have Buddha-nature." The importance of its not so saying we will show later. This is not to say that the Lotus Sutra had no profound philosophical ideas. As acknowledged above, the sutra took in such doctrines as current in its surrounding, from the Hinayana skandhas to Mahayana emptiness, from the elemental dhyanas to intimation of the bodhisattNic bhumis. To say it is not a philosophical work would horrify the traditional Tendai scholastic whose understanding is that this sutra has enough depth of insight to engage anyone for a life time. This point we do not mean to dispute. But it is as much to the credit of Chih-i in unearthing these hidden meanings (hsuan-i 玄 義) as it is to the merit of the sutra in keeping such mysteries, for all practical purposes, esoteric. They are so very less than obvious to the untrained eye that without Chih-i we probably would never have become cognizant of them and the arabesque structure of this text. It takes a genius to uncover what most of us can never see. But as a historian of ideas who must record the growth of ideas as a growth in the exegetical tradition that unfolded in time, I must stay first with the obvious and the apparent (the Lotus Sutra as express ive of popular piety) and only take into account the less obvious and the bet ter concealed (when we come to Chih-i). Otherwise we would let medieval scholastics overshadow the pristine gospel. Posing the problem this way brings us to the next, somewhat controversial, issue.
The Lotus Sutra as Buddhayana, Bodhisattvayana, and Ekayana As alluded to in passing, we regard the Lotus tradition to be very different from the Prajnaparamita (Prajna or Wisdom) tradition. This is contrary to orthodox understanding. Ever since Chih-i explicated the Lotus Sutra using the tools derived from the Madhyamika philosophy, which is rooted in the Wisdom tradition, most scholars simply cannot consider the Lotus tradition as being originally (not finally) distinct from the Wisdom tradition. This af fects a major departure on our part from the current theory or theories on Mahayana genesis.
The genesis of Mahayana is still hidden. The older, more textualist, theory is to trace Mahayana to the Mahasamgikas. But mention has been made in the last section concerning the popularity of the stupa cult well attested to by archaeology. This fact has led Hirakawa to amend the older thesis since the older thesis cannot sufficiently account for the ideological and the sociologi cal break. Ideationally Maihayana took over ideas not just from the liberals but also the conservatives. Sociologically Mah5yana broke with both the lib erals and the conservatives. Noting the importance of the stupa cult, which is extra-canonical (i.e., separate from the Dharma entrusted to the monk lead ers of the sectarians), Hirakawa at first proposes that lay-dominated cultus as a more viable base for the rise of Mahayana. But as noted, the stupa cult was not an exclusively lay movement. Therefore Shizutani amended Hirakawa's thesis by noting that (a) it was a mixed lay-and-monk cult in which (b) certain preachers {dharmabhanakas) seem to act as their communal leaders (1967) . Judging from the praise given to these Dharma masters, it seems that they were the articulators for the seminal Mahayana tradition. The identity of these preachers, what exactly they proclaimed, and whether they were one homogeneous group with one homogeneous message is far from clear.
Those issues aside, there is one major problem in the stupa-genesis thesis. Textually speaking, "Mah5ySna" by definition arose along with the Prajna paramita Sutras because this corpus is the first to proclaim a new Dharma, the first to claim a separate Bodhisattvayana, and the first to call that "Mahay5na" at the expense of the "HInay5na" of the §ravakas (listeners). But this significantly contradicts the Hirakawa thesis since the Prajnaparamita tradi tion glorifies the emptiness of wisdom as Dharmakaya (the three terms Sunyata, prajna, and dharmakaya are here synonymous) and as a Dharmacentered movement had little good to say about sttipa worship. Specifically, it teaches that the bodhisattva should honor the Dharmakaya and not the Rupakaya -whether that be the person Sakyamuni or any of his physical remains {sanra). The bodhisattva, like the arhant after the demise of the Buddha, adheres to the dictum of "Follow ye the Dharma and not the Per son." Dharma is now specifically the unborn, a synonym for emptiness, in the formulaic anutpattidharma-k^anti, a passive, meditative recognition of reality as unborn [i.e.， as being neither 01 Dirth nor of cessation]. Given its Dharmacentrism and his disparaging of Buddha relics, it is hard to see how this wis dom tradition could be intrinsically tied to a tradition of faith centered on the Buddha and his glorified body. Or how its ideal,a formless Dharmakaya (im personal), with no beginning or end (i.e., eternal) could sit well with an adoration of a very concrete, transcendental personality that is tied to what would be then the Rupakaya by his assessment. (The Lotus Sutra does not know even that Dharmakaya and Rupakaya distinction, and there was not yet the notion of a SaipbhogakSya.)
In view of this discrepancy I propose, as a methodological necessity, that the Wisdom tradition not be traced to the stupa cult and that the latter, the Un-Lotus tradition, be granted a separate socio-ideological lineage, following what we said earlier that there were two foci of Jewel-adherence after the Buddha passed away:
at the stupa centers with monk-lay participation that is trans-sectarian = Roots of a Buddhayana Dharma: Dharma-centric wisdom- [abhidharma-defined] for sectarian monks experiencing post-A 名 oka schism between village-dwelling monks and forest dwelling ascetics = Sravaka, Pratyekabuddhayana
The canon was the Dharma (sutra-vinaya) and the sectarians were defined by the D harm a. The stupa cult was extra-canonical and thus duly trans sectarian. It existed side by side with the various sects, ready to accept one and all devotees, an indiscriminate piety that would inform the Ekayana slogan later when it could declare itself as a new teaching or Dharma. The hitch was that this devotional cult, being centered on the Buddha, originally had no Dharma of its own. It could not because it had followed the person (the Buddha) and not the Dharma. According to the sectarian doctrine of the separation of the Three Jewels preserved in the vinaya, which states that the three refuges are distinct and separate -such that the goods donated to one jewel can never be used by another without its explicit permission -any physical or emtaphysical fusion of the Buddha jewel and the Dharma jewel was disallowed. Non-aligned with the liberals or the conservatives, though patronized by both, the stupa cult originally had no Y ana consciousness. Even when it did develop a Yana-identity, its Buddhayana did not fall into any of the traditional Triyanas, i.e., §ravaka-, Pratyekabuddha-, and Bodhi sattvayana. For its scripture it had gathas (verses), jatakas (birth stories of the Buddha), and avadanas (birth stories of other Buddhas) but it had no sutra. A nd that is not just because the sutra canon (the Nikaya) was in the hands of the monks but more importantly because a formal sutra always presumes a sutra-dharma. That is to say, a sutra should always be Dharma-centered, not Buddha-centered.
One should not be too purist about this. Extra-canonical "siitras" dedi cated to teachings about other Buddhas such as Aksobhya and Amitabha were probably in circulation. Shizutani would date the "primitive" or UrMahSyana corpus at 100 B.C. to A.D. 100, that predating even the "early5 ， or consciously M ahayana corpus (beginning with the A^tasahasrika-prajnaparam ita Sutra, by his count, A.D. 50-250. The mark of the Ur-Mahayana corpus is that it does not know itself as "Mahayana•" And this label indeed does not appear even in the classic Sukhavativyuha corpus. I would postulate that these Vaipulya "stltras， ' were tolerated by the sectarians most probably because they were considered to be lores about other Buddhas other than Sakyamuni, and as such beyond the purview of the sons of Sakyamuni who were keepers only of the Sakya tradition.
A t any rate, for some three centuries after the parinirvana of the Buddha, the Dharma and the Buddha tradition grew side by side. Then came an im portant change. Both the stupa cult, now a full caitya (large, temple com pound) center and the dharmic learning, now a full abhidharma system, flourished after A^oka lent the tradition his imperial support. But as with Constantine and his patronage of Christianity, Buddhism under A^oka also suffered the bane of worldliness that came with prosperity.
Our hypothesis is that the Prajnaparamita tradition rose up against not one but both of these developments. It indeed castigated both the stupa devo tion and the abhidharmic scholastics. This seminal Mahayana tradition, con trary to acccepted reading, rose not within but in tension with the urbane cult of stupas and the settled community of the village monks. Like the Desert Fathers who reacted to the secularity of the Constantinean Church -with its share of mindless magic and doctrinal nitpicking-the future Mahayana bodhisattvas were ascetics rooted I believe in the very ancient tradition of the aryanikas, the forest-dwelling monks, who pursued, as forest-dwellers always had, a program of superhuman perfection or paramitas. Before these forest monks were remade by an adoring public into the classic bodhisattva saints, much as the desert Fathers became (despite their withdrawl from the world) the living saints and intercessors of the Church, they were probably regarded as pratyekabuddhas, the solitarily enlightened. Our hypothesis is that the pratyekabuddha was not yet seen as one who enlightened himself with no compulsion to save others. That is the later schematized reading. Pratyeka buddha at one time seems not to refer to some nebulous, unknown self enlightened but silent Buddhas. It seems to be a term used, as it is still used in Jainism, to describe the recluse ascetics. As a class of actual dhutas known to an admiring public, they are still so recognized in the Pali canon. The title of Pratyekabuddha is still an attribute given to revered forest monks in folk Theravada Buddhism and given even nowadays by modern historians to the rebel ascetics in Mahayana (Bodhidharma and the early Zen masters had been so typed).
The placement of the pratyekabuddha in the Triayana scheme remains even now problematical. We have two views of the relationship between the Three Vehicles, one assuming the three were continuous grades while the other one would have them as discrete destinies:
1 .The (earlier) continuous model:
Arhant -> Pratyekabuddha 一> Bodhisattva ~> Samyaksambuddha A person can advance from one to the next through higher virtues. Preserved by Buddhaghosa in Theravada and in the Mahayana bhumis.
2. The (classic) discrete model: Sravakagotra, Pratyekabuddhagotra, and Bodmsattvagotra are separate.
Distinction now based on dependence/independence/advocacy. Once determined, a gotra cannot cross over into another.
I believe the first model is earlier and that certain forest-ascetics were being graded as individual saints, lesser than the Buddha but higher than his now secularized disciples in the village, the ^ravakasy and that the future Mahayana tradition (called Bodhisattvayana by the time of its proclamation) was rooted in this tradition of the solitary desert saints of Buddhism.
That this tracing of the Prajnaparamita tradition to the forest-dwelling monks is not spurious is supported by the fact that the sixparamitas nearly all spell of asceticism. Even the first {dana paramita) has little to do with dona tion of goods. Practising such a charitable virtue due a layman is honorable, but by definition paramita is more than even the Eight Noble Paths. It means superhuman perfection, total giving. D ana param ita in the classic jatakas meant selfless sacrifice of the self. Thus it is a mistake to connect the primacy of dana paramita with the popular donative piety of stupa worshippers. The original bodhisattva path is the path of a few pratyekabuddhas, but this Way or Yana of a rare handful became much admired by the populace -forest dwelling monks still are so awe-inspiring as to have extraordinary powers at tributed to them -that as the holy ones, the great beings, Mahasattvas, they were remade or reclaimed as the Mahasattva Bodhisattvas whose way then grew into what was then renamed as Mahayana. Because of their forest origin, this new movement existed in tension with the sravaka, the archetypal Hinayanist, a Listener, someone who kept the canon in the village. The pratyekabuddha， the solitary saint, also came under criticism later, with the added impetus of the compassionate bodhisattva ideal. Henceforth, in the classic scheme of the Triyana (see above), the pratyekabuddhas became grouped with the Hinayana. Still ambivalence remains. Mahayana typically targets the §ravaka-arhant for criticism, and much less so the pratyeka buddha.
Forest-dwellers of course did not start movements. Solitary souls did not create sizeable communities, any more than St. Anthony fanned the cult of the Desert Fathers. The legend of St. Anthony was spread by the Church Fa thers themselves in admiration of his lifestyle. So likewise may we suspect the same happened to these pratyekabuddhas. It is the popularization of their virtue (paramitas) and powers (tapas) that led to the transformation and maturation of their path into the Mahayana Bodhisattvayana. That, however, is another story.
This hypothesis of Mah5y5na genesis with the forest ascetics can be sup ported by an analysis of the legend concerning the formation of the Hinayana canon itself. By " listeners" is meant one who follows the teachings of the Buddha. In the institutionalized Sangha, the teaching is the sutra-vinaya and to listen is to hear these codified words repeated in and by the community of bhiksus. But forest-dwelling monks lived far away from such monasteries. Being contemplatives, they had few scriptures and even less use for them. They had few images and knew little communal matrka recitations. They at tained enlightenment in solitude. This is quite unlike the sectarian Buddhists, liberal or conservative, who had their sutra, vinaya, and eventually, their sec tarian abhidharma. So protective were they of the authority of the canon that their record would remember the First C ouncil as one attended by all Arhants (five hundred in number). There was then no category of pratyeka buddhas. But there was one Arhant missing and it was the venerable Gavampati， who when summoned to join the council in effect refused and in the heat of tapas, extinguished him self in like m anner as the Buddha. He represents the non-conformist pratyekabuddha who would have no part in the cult of the memorized, and later the written, the well chanted and thus well harkened to, canon. But if he should be the stubborn outsider, the five hundred Arhants who legitimized communal living also staked their claim. In order to jo in the council, they are said to have renounced the places they delighted in most-living in mountains, forests, near lakes, or in caves. This Church community repudiated the solitary lifestyle.
But lo and behold, whom should the early Prajnaparamita Siitras make its spokesmen? Not someone known as a Bodhisattva by name, because that as sociation to the Bodhisattva category was yet unknown. The teaching of Emptiness came from the disciple of the Buddha who is known to love dwell ing in mountains and lakes: Subhuti, traditionally known to us as an Arhant. It always seemed strange to me why Mahayana emptiness should be taught by an Arhant until I realize that Subhuti really symbolizes a pratyekabuddha， a forest ascetic, at a time when the Triyana categories have not become so schematized and discrete. And whom did Subhuti criticize? Sariputra the dis ciple, known not just for his wisdom as is the usual reading (Sariputra is tied later to the abhidharmic tradition) but also for being the one who instituted village-dwelling monks. H e was the one who established the Buddhist monastic community close to the village to serve and be served by the laity, whose support was what provided the leisure for abhidharmic studies in the first place. Thus the Subhuti-Sariputra exchange in the earliest texts of the Prajna corpus points us back to the real source of the Wisdom tradition: ten sion between forest-dwelling monks and village-dwelling monks after the reign of A 点 oka had secularized the latter enough to make these Buddhist Desert Fathers the saints of a new era.
M aking this methodological distinction between the Lotus Buddhayana and the Prajiia Bodhisattvayana would help to account for some of the pecu liarity of the Lotus tradition that scholars to date have failed to account for satisfactorily. A long dissertation is not possible here, so briefly, these Doints are: a) Why, although some portions of the Lotus might predate the Prajna corpus, the Lotus as Sutra could only emerge after the Prajna tradition had effected a break with the sectarians? This is because the Prajna tradition, by proclaiming a new Dharma (the Unborn), was the first to create a new sutra (buddhavacana) with which to repudiate the authority of the Nikaya canon. It was only after this Bodhisattvayana effected the M ahayana break with Hinayana that the non-aligned and extra-canonical Lotus tradition joined the Great Vehicle.
b) To do so, the Lotus had to proclaim itself a Dharm a (Saddharma). However, this involved a transormation of what was originally a Buddhacentric cult into a Dharma-centric cult. The Lotus Sutra must have a sutra-D h a rm a . This explains why, though the Lotus Sutra quite obviously championed Buddha-devotion, the final position (and the official Tendai doc trine) is that the object of worship {horizon 本尊）is not the Buddha but the (Sutra) Dharma itself.
c) The sutra-ization of the Lotus devotion led to the displacement of the Buddha-relic by the Sutra itself. This not only led to the popularity of copying the sutra to the preservation of the D harm a, but led later to the ritual enshrinement of the written pustaka (book) in the stupa itself in lieu of actual physical relics. In that cultic twist, one also follows the Dharma and not the Person, even though the Saddharma declares the longevity of the Buddha. d) Mahayana as Bodhisattvayana at first accepted the distinction of the Three Vehicles, since it was upon the discreteness of the three (sravaka, pratyekabuddha, bodhisattva) that the superiority of the bodhisattva vehicle is established. But the Lotus came after that, and continuing its primordial trans-sectarianism, repealed the three in an endorsement of itself as the One Vehicle. Ekayana refers originally to an inclusive Buddhayana， what Fa-yiin justly called the "fourth vehicle." The Lotus Buddhayana was then more than the W isdom Bodhisattvayana. It is only later when that distinction was smoothed out that we now accept the orthodox reading of Mahayana, Bod hisattvayana, ekayana^ and Buddhayana as synonyms. A t one time, however, Buddhayandi-ekayana transcended Bodhisattvayana-Triyana. e) A qualification: Our attribution of Bodhisattvayana to the tradition of the forest-dwelling pratyekabuddhas seems to be duly contradicted by the Vim a lakxrti-n irdesa Sutra where the hero is a householder bodhisattva of prosperous Vaisali. Space does not allow a full defense of our thesis. Briefly though, the Vimalakirti-nirde^a Sutra is a separate and slightly later tradition than the original P rajnaparam ita Sutras, It even repudiated the forestdwelling tradition (the mark of Subhuti) and attacked it in a well-concealed way, namely, by having Vimalakirti mock Sariputra (!) for meditating in the forest. It transposed the m ark o f Subhuti, the new target, onto his old protagonist, the village-dwelling Sariputra.
A ll that is now history. The mature Mahayana tradition fused Lotus devotion and Prajna wisdom. A nd Chih-i is fully justified to fuse these two traditions into one, allowing Madhyamika in a "round, perfect" dialectics to make sense of the Oneness of ekayana and making it possiole for the positive reality of Dharma (the shih-hsiang of dhartnata) to modify the negative tone of empti ness in the Prajnaparamita corpus. After him, it is impossible to read the Lotus Siitra with the kind of critical innocence we have assumed above. But no synthesis is ever flawless, not even the Tendai one. The very imperfection can hold the key to the dynamism of the tradition itself. O f the many untold tensions we could write on, we will select a few and end with one that Ruben Habito has addressed.
The Continual Tension between the Personal and the Impersonal
Despite the eventual fusion of Faith and Wisdom in Mahayana, sufficient ten sions survived in the Lotus tradition itself to give it a unique stamp. This is because faith in the Buddha will always be somehow more personal, more specific, more committed to a historical memory and horizon than intuition into a Wisdom that is impersonal, universal, and timeless.
The orthodox reading of the Lotus Sutra would say that it endorses the idea of a permanent Dharmakaya and teaches the universality of Buddhanature. But neither idea can be found so literally in the Lotus Sutra. For example, except in the later-inserted Devadatta chapter (into the preferred Kumarajlva translation), the Lotus Sutra did not know of the term Dharma kaya. It had never used it or had use for it. Instead of that impersonal Absolute, the sutra knows the Buddha as mythopoeically having a very, very long lifespan. Longevity is not eternity. Unlike the Dharma that has neither beginning nor end, the Lotus which depicts the Buddha as having a long life still keeps to the memory of finite historicity. Namely, there is logically a be ginning to the Buddha career (i.e. a time when he had not embarked on the path of Bodhisattvacarya toward enlightenment, and it is assumed that one day he would come to a well-deserved end -final parinirvana or extinction). That is the legacy of Mythos over against Logos.
Likewise, not knowing the gnostic distinction between the form and the formless, the Rupakaya-Dharmakaya dualism in the Wisdom sutras, the Lotus Sutra knows the long-living Buddha only in a glorified form. The Lotus retains simply the older, the cruder, the Mahasamgika-shared idea of a Buddha with wellnigh boundless physical form (*ye hsin 色身， rupakaya), meaning in AvadSna language that the Buddha can project multiple bodies at will, assume identity with other Buddhas in time, and recall into himself the myriad Buddhas in space. A ll these are realistically depicted in the sutra itself in a language that would befuddle the modern mind but delight anyone who has any sensitivity toward the sublime. Though often philosophically categori zed as docetic, the mystery in the Lotus Sutra is actually never phrased in terms of Sakyamuni being some docetic shadow of some eternal Wisdom. The mystery is rather that somehow the historical Buddha preaching the sutra at Vulture Peak is at once the eternal Buddha preaching eternally this eternal sutra at this num inous axis m undi (nay, this Pure Land) and dharmaman^a (Jpn. dojo 道場 J of a sacred mountain in India.
The Lotus Siitra has no use for some cerebal formula like an eternal Dharmakaya. Such a pure Dharmakaya concept would enforce a dualism of Dharmakaya and Rupakaya, of enlightened mind and coarse body, of the pure and the polluted, whereas the genius of the Tendai tradition, following what we said above about the translucency of the physical and the noumenal, is that it could and did weave these opposites together in Chih-i's tripartite dialectics. It is this interpretation that modified the more abstract (<Samsara is nirv5pa" dictum of the Wisdom tradition to produce such a human (nondocetic) conception as the "Buddha with essential evil" (hsing-o 性悪） . The same down-to-earthliness is responsible for its preference for a personalist reading of eternity, best seen in the myth of the dual Buddhas on one lotus seat. Prabhutaratna, or "Many Jewels" (symbol of the abundant treasure of merits lodged at the stupa), is the past enlightened Buddha that somehow ap peared while Sakyamuni was preaching the Lotus Siitra, He broke the time barrier that divided past and present -Buddhas of the past were not sup posed to live into the realm of a Buddha of the present -to share the same seat of enlightenment with Sakyamuni, Buddha of the present. The Tendai scholastics say that all three times (past, present, and future) are One, but in this key episode in the Lotus Sutra history is so respected that the yet unen lightened Maitreya, Buddha of the future, is still kept waiting in the wing, dumbfounded and wondering what was going on. This scene only encapsu lated the unity of past, present, and future to come in the end of time. In this scene Prabhutaratna appears as the intimation of a Buddha of longevity. The hypostasis of the stupa with abundant merits, he had his own cult, claiming stupas of ms own decked with "many jewels" and usually grander than the stupas of Sakyamuni. There are icons as well of the Dual-Seated Buddha. In all this, we are dealing with the extravagance of form, not the abstraction of formlessness; mythic reality, not logic.
Likewise the Lotus Sutra never said "A ll sentient beings have Buddhanature." Tms idea is embedded in the omnipresence of the Buddha which is represented in the language of the Buddha splitting his body into a multitude of Buddhas (an old, supernatural power granted the Buddha) and of recalling all these Buddhas back into himself (which happened prior to Prabhutaratna's self-disclosure). H is omnipotence is phrased in terms of his all knowing wisdom, his omniscience by a light flowing like a stream to lit up all corners of the universe in the opening chapter -a common and standard scene given prior to a demonstration of his prophetic powers or vyakarana.
In so refusing an escape into some timeless emptiness, the Lotus Sutra kept up a more historical perspective than the Wisdom Sutras. For example, the attention paid to specific vyakarana (prophecies) means that this sutra did not reduce all human fate to one homogeneous Buddha-nature. As a matter of fact, the genre of vyakarana eclipsed precisely after the Mahayana version of the Nirvarta Sutra so afforded every sentient being a share of the timeless Buddha-nature. History became irrelevant when enlightenment becomes om nipresent. Mah5yana lost that sense of historicity soon thereafter. Ahistorical Buddhas overshadowed the Historical Sakyamuni. The Lotus Siitra suffered that shift in the later appended chapters of the sutra away from Sakyamuni and history to more ahistorical Buddhas and bodhisattvas. These are inde pendent chapters dedicated largely to nonhistorical bodhisattvas coming from a more unstable time (second or third century A.D.). But then to its credit the sutra does succeed in drawing them under the Lotus umbrella. The historical sense is heightened by eschatological hope and despair, making the Lotus Sutra a timely sutra in moments of crisis. The revival of Lotus piety in those hours in the history of East Asian Buddhism is no accident. Nichiren and the New Religions of Japan only carried out the mission assigned within the sutra itself.
The Survival o f the Buddhayana Motifs in Later Mahayana
Buddhayana and Bodhisattvayana did fuse into mature Mahayana. The Lotus and the Prajna tradition also became indisassociably one. If we look closer we can still find tension between Buddhayana and Bodhisattvayana. This is diagrammatized as follows. The bodhisattva concept has two modes, (a) In Low Buddhology, the bodhisattva is the Buddha-to-be, one still striving after wisdom, (b) In High Buddhology, the bodhisattva is already enlightened and is now exercising upaya and karuna for the deliverance of other sentient beings.
Bodhisattva as yet unenlightened . B O D H I. Bodhisattva as savior
The early Prajna tradition knew only the former; its six ascetic paramitas did not include upayay karurya^ or jnana (for samsyaksambodhi). The original Lotus tradition knew only the latter; the virtues are in reverse. It is the latter tradition that would endorse a higher notion of an active Buddhahood, and consequently a higher notion of the Buddhakaya.
Although the two traditions fused, still the Lotus Buddha excels over the Prajna Dharmakaya in two aspects.( 1 ) The Dharmakaya as empty, sunya, was by definition without attributes (nirguna), but the Lotus Buddha by his formal personality is necessarily gifted with extraordinary gunas and cannot be ontologically empty; (2) Emptiness as wisdom was knowable to the bod hisattva, but what is not-empty {a §unyay i.e., the marvelous attributes or gunas of the Buddha in the Buddhayana tradition) lies beyond the limits of the bodhisattva's wisdom. This second aspect is already stressed in the Lotus Sutra, which held its higher mystery of Buddhahood as something known only among Buddhas, something not privileged even to the highest of bodhi sattvas. From this noumenal standpoint of the Lotus Buddhayana (plus inputs from the Avatamsaka tradition) came the so-called Tathagatagarbha tradi tion. The Snmaladevi Sutra then repeats the claim that its tathagatagarbha mystery is not known to or knowable by the bodhisattvas. In addition, it for m alized the first aspect noted above and postulated explicitly an asunya tathagatagarbha, a not-empty store of merits stored in this matrix of the Buddha (omnipresent in all beings) that contradicted and overcame the pas sive nihilism of emptiness, the Nuriya tathagatagarbha.
These two lines of Buddhayana conception-the Lotus line that stresss an enpowered, not-empty, Buddhakaya actively working for the deliverance of man, and the Prajna line that stresses the self-effort of the seeker of wisdom or bodhisattva striving after Buddhahood to come-in turn affected the later reading of the dispensation of the Trikaya. As well documented by Habito,2 the Lotus line ended up in the Ratnagotravibhaga and the PrajnU line in the Mahayanasutralamkara. In the former, where significantly the emphasis is on the asunya attributes o f the Buddha, it is on the Dharmakaya which is emanating into and enpowering the Sambhogakaya for the deliverance of sentient beings. Habito types this as a Buddhakaya conception from " above down." In the latter, which follows more closely the Prajnaparamita as the upward striving of the bodhisattva, the stress is on the Sambhogakaya as the well-deserved, self-achieved, Enjoyment Body of the seeker after \^isdom, and the centerpiece of the Trikaya scheme. This affirms our contention that the faith tradition is responsible for the conception of a concrete personality working for others and the Wisdom tradition is instrumental in the percep tion of an impersonal emptiness without, initially, positive gunas to effect changes in the world. The latter follows rather logically from its roots in the pratyekabuddha tradition of the solitary forest-dwelling gnostics.3 2 In a paper given at a symposium at the Nanzan Institute for Culture and Religion on Tendai Buddhism and Christianity, 16-18 March, 1987 . These papers will be published in the near future by Shunjusha.
3 Habito， s thesis has changed my previous view on the place of the Sambhogakaya in the economy of the TrikSya. I had worked on the assumption that since the Lotus Sutra stressed the personhood of the transcendental Buddha, this is what injected or necessitated the postulation of a third body, the Sambhogakaya, in the two bodies theory of the Prajnaparamitas. I was expecting the Sambhogakaya to be the key item that the tathagatagarbhadefined Ratnagotravibhaga would bring out. I was not prepared for its displacement by the Dharmakaya whose superiority I associated with the Prajna tradition. 
Conclusion
In the above short excursion into the reasons for the historic significance of the Lotus Siitray I have attempted to show how (a) in its core, the Lotus Siitra is one of the oldest of the Buddhist teachings, one dedicated to the venera tion of the Buddha and the living memory of his person despite his seeming extinction; (b) that as Buddhayana it was originally distinct from the Bod hisattvayana of the Wisdom Sutras into whose Mahayana camp the Lotus Sutra only later joined; but how (c) even in so doing, the Lotus Sutra was never absorbed into the gnosticism of the Prajflな tradition but preserved much better the sense of history and personality, maybe not to the extent of how History and personality are understood in the Christian tradition, but nonetheless most significantly so. And (d) not only did the Lotus Sutra champion a higher ekaydna qua Buddhayana that opposed the teaching of a timeless Wisdom and formless Dharmakaya of the originally Triy5na-based emptiness tradition, the Lotus Sutra contributed to a more positive under standing o f the Buddhakaya in the Trikaya scheme, enpowering the notempty Dharmakaya to emanate into the salvaic Sambhogakaya. Furthermore (c) with its commitment to specific historic destinies in its prophetic genre (vyakarana), the Lotus tradition enhanced the eschatological gospel founa in its later chapters. A ll this makes for a dynamic tradition that thrives to this day and provides an objective, historical, and comparative answer to the question o f why the Lotus Sutra is o f such pivotal importance in Buddhist ecclesiastical history. 
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